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We propose a theoretical scheme for secure quantum key distribution network following the ideas
in quantum dense coding. In this scheme, the server of the network provides the service for preparing
and measuring the Bell states, and the users encodes the states with local unitary operations. For
preventing the server from eavesdropping, we design a decoy when the particle is transmitted between
the users. It has high capacity as one particle carries two bits of information and its efficiency for
qubits approaches 100%. Moreover, it is not necessary for the users to store the quantum states,
which makes this scheme more convenient for application than others.
PACS numbers: 3.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
Quantum key distribution (QKD), the most advanced
application of the principles in quantum mechanics
within the field of information, such as the uncertainty
principle and quantum correlations, provides a secure
way for two remote parties, say Alice and Bob to create
a randomly binary string that can be used as a private
key with which they can communicate securely using Ver-
nam one-time pad crypto-system [1]. In the key trans-
mission with classical line only, a vicious eavesdropper,
Eve can monitor the line freely without leaving a trace.
But the uncertainty principle assures that Eve cannot
copy an unknown quantum state of single particle [2]. In
1984, Bennett and Brassard [3] designed the first theo-
retical model for quantum key distribution based on non-
cloning theorem [2], called BB84 QKD protocol. Quan-
tum correlations of entangled particles or wave-packets
also help people to do key distribution in an uncondi-
tionally secure way. Ekert [4] proposed another QKD
scheme based on the correlation of Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen (EPR) pair, the maximal entangled state of two
particles in 1991. To date, a great number of works
have been done on QKD both in theoretical aspects
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] and in experimental
implementations [16, 17].
Most of the existing QKD protocols concentrate on
point-to-point key distribution between two remote par-
ties. The practical application of QKD requires the com-
munication of any-to-any key distribution on a network,
same as the classical communication network (world
web). Unfortunately, there are only a little of works fo-
cused on multi-user quantum key distribution (MUQKD)
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22] on a passive optical network. Some
[18, 19, 20] of them choose single photons as quantum in-
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formation carrier (QIC) and measure them with two sets
of measuring bases (MBs), the rectilinear basis σz and
the diagonal basis σx. Their total efficiency ηt is low. ηt
is defined as [8, 9]
ηt =
bs
qt + bt
, (1)
where bs is the number of bits in the key, qt is the number
of qubits used, and bt is the number of classical bits ex-
changed between the parties. For example, the efficiency
ηt in Ref. [19] is lower than
1
16
as no more than 1
8
QIC
can be used as the qubits in the raw key. Xue et. al.
proposed a MUQKD protocol with the combination of
two-particle product states and entangled states follow-
ing the ideas in Ref. [7], and almost all of the instances
can be used as the raw key and two particles can carry
one bit of quantum information. In the MUQKD scheme
[22], EPR pairs are used as QIC and are transmitted with
two quantum channels. The four local unitary operations
represent four kinds of coding. It is the generalization of
the Long-Liu point-to-point QKD protocol [9] into the
case with many users on a passive optical network. With
quantum storage (quantum memory) [23, 24, 25, 26], its
efficiency for qubit ηq ≡ quqt approaches 100% and its to-
tal efficiency ηt approaches 50% as all the EPR pairs are
useful for the raw key and only two bits of classical in-
formation are exchanged for two qubits, where qu is the
useful qubits. Certainly, the technique of quantum stor-
age is not fully developed at present. However it is a vital
ingredient for quantum computation and quantum infor-
mation, and there has been great interests in developing
it [23, 24, 25, 26]. It is believed that this technique will
be available in the future. With quantum memory, many
new applications can be constructed, such as quantum
computation [27], quantum secure direct communication
[28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37] and quantum secret
splitting [38, 39].
In this paper, we want to introduce a MUQKD scheme
2with EPR pairs following the ideas in quantum dense cod-
ing [40]. In this scheme, the users on the network need
only perform single-particle measurement and exploit a
decoy technique, replacing some of the particles in the
original QIC with those whose states are unknown for
others, to guarantee its security. The information is en-
coded on the states with four local unitary operations.
The efficiency and the capacity of this MUQKD scheme
are maximal, same as those in Ref. [22]. Moreover it
does not require the users to store the quantum states
received and only one particle in each EPR pair runs
through the quantum channel, which make this MUQKD
scheme more convenient for the practical application.
An EPR pair is in one of the four Bell states shown as
follows[9, 11, 22]:
∣
∣ψ−
〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B − |1〉A |0〉B), (2)
∣
∣ψ+
〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |1〉B + |1〉A |0〉B), (3)
∣∣φ−
〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B − |1〉A |1〉B), (4)
∣∣φ+
〉
AB
=
1√
2
(|0〉A |0〉B + |1〉A |1〉B). (5)
The four local unitary operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) can
transform one of the Bell states into each other.
U0 = |0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1| , U1 = |0〉 〈1| − |1〉 〈0| ,
U2 = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1| , U3 = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| . (6)
For example,
I ⊗ U0|φ+〉 = |φ+〉, I ⊗ U1|φ+〉 = −|ψ−〉, (7)
I ⊗ U2|φ+〉 = |ψ+〉, I ⊗ U3|φ+〉 = |φ−〉, (8)
where I = U0 is the 2×2 identity matrix.
First, let us compare the quantum dense coding with
the Long-Liu point-to-point QKD scheme. In quantum
dense coding [40], the QIC is the EPR pairs transmit-
ted in one by one and one of the two particles in each
pair runs forth and back from the receiver of information,
Carol to the sender Bob. The other particle is hold in the
hand of Carol. The information is encoded on the state
with the four unitary operations Ui chosen randomly by
Bob. After the particle encoded returns to Carol, she
performs the Bell state measurement on the EPR pair
and reads out the information about the operation. In
this way, a particle can carry two bits of information with
running forth and back. In the Long-Liu point-to-point
QKD protocol [9], the EPR pairs are transmitted by us-
ing two split channels in a quantum data block, which is
necessary for QSDC [28, 29, 30] but not for QKD as the
analysis of the security in QKD is just a post-processing.
The advantage of Long-Liu QKD protocol [9] is that the
loss of the qubits is lower by far than that in quantum
dense coding when there are noise and loss in the quan-
tum channel as all the QIC are transmitted from the
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FIG. 1: The topological structure of the network, similar
to those in Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]: (a) loop-configuration
network; (b) star-configuration network.
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FIG. 2: The subsystem of the network in this MUQKD
scheme. The server provides the service for preparing and
measuring the Bell states, Bob and Carol choose randomly
the control mode and the coding mode for the particles re-
ceived. They sends the particles to next one when they choose
the coding mode, otherwise they perform single-particle mea-
surement on the particles received with one of the two MBs
randomly. For preventing the server from eavesdropping, Bob
exploit the decoy technique with a certain probability, i.e., re-
placing the original particle with his one prepared with one
of the two MBs.
sender to the receiver once. This advantage will disap-
pear in the case [22] with many user on a network.
Now we discuss our MUQKD scheme in detail. Al-
though the topological structure of the network can be
loop or star, similar to those in Refs. [18, 19, 20, 21, 22]
shown in Fig.1, its subsystem can be simplified to that in
Fig.2, composed of the server (Alice), the sender (Bob)
3and the receiver (Carol). Suppose Alice is the server of
the sender, Bob. If Carol is in another branch of the net-
work, her server, say Alicei provides the quantum chan-
nel for her to communicate with Bob only in a given time
slot [21, 22]. So this MUQKD scheme is explicit if we de-
scribe clearly the subsystem in Fig.2. For the integrality
of this MUQKD scheme, we describe the steps in detail,
including some same as those in Ref. [22].
(S1) All the users on the network agree that the four
unitary operations, U0, U1, U2 and U3 represent the bits
00, 01, 10 and 11, respectively. The server Alice prepares
the QIC in the original state |φ+〉AB.
(S2) Alice sends the particle B to Bob and keeps the
particle A in home.
(S3) Bob chooses randomly the control mode or the
coding mode, similar to that in Ref. [41]. When he
chooses the control mode, he performs the single-particle
measurement on particle B by choosing the two MBs, σz
or σx with the same probability. He tell Alice his MB
for the particle B and requires her measure the particle
A with the same MB. Alice publishes the result of the
measurement, which is a sample for eavesdropping check
during the phase that the particle is transmitted between
Alice and Bob.
If Bob chooses the coding mode, he chooses randomly
one of the four unitary operations {Ui}, say UB and per-
forms it on the particle B, and then sends the particle to
Carol.
Surely, in order to prevent Alice (the server who pre-
pares the QIC) from eavesdropping the quantum chan-
nel between Bob and Carol, Bob should choose the third
mode, the decoy mode for the particle B with a cer-
tain probability. In this time, he replaces the particle
B with the particle d in state |χ〉d ∈ {|0〉, |1〉, | + x〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), | − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉)} prepared by himself
with two MBs σz and σx randomly in advance, and then
sends it to Carol. Bob measures the particle B with the
same MB as that for preparing the particle d.
(S4) Carol performs her operation on particle B similar
to Bob except for the third mode. When she chooses the
control mode, she measures the particle with two MBs
randomly and requires Alice do the correlated measure-
ment with the same MB on the particle A and publish
the result; otherwise she operates the particle with one of
the four unitary operations randomly, say UC and then
sends it to Alice.
(S5) Alice takes a joint Bell state measurement on the
EPR pair after she receives the particle returned from
Carol. She announces in public the result of the measure-
ment, UA = UB ⊗ UC which is the combined operations
performed by Bob and Carol.
(S6) Carol obtains the bits encoded on the particle B
done by Bob according to her operations UC and the
information published by Alice, RC = UA ⊗ UC .
(S7) Alice, Bob and Carol repeat the processes above
for distributing the bits until they can obtain enough re-
sults Rc. Bob tells Carol the position where she replaces
the particle B with her particle d.
(S8) Alice, Bob and Carol choose some of the instances
as samples for eavesdropping check and complete the
analysis of the error rates of the samples.
In detail, there are several sequences of the samples
for eavesdropping check. One is the results that Bob ob-
tains with the control mode, say s
Bc
. One is the results
obtained by Carol with the control mode, say s
Cc
which
are divided into two parts, s
Cc0
and s
Cc1
come from the
measurements on the particle B and the particle d re-
spectively. The third is the results chosen by Bob ran-
domly from the instances for which both Bob and Carol
choose coding mode, say s
w
. Alice, Bob and Carol ex-
ploit the refined error analysis technique [7] for checking
eavesdropping.
(S9) If all the error rates are lower than the threshold,
Bob and Carol can distill the key with error correction
and privacy amplification [27] from the results RBC for
which they both choose the code mode. Otherwise, they
abandon the results and repeat the quantum communi-
cation from the beginning.
Now, let us discuss some issues about the security of
this MUQKD scheme.
There are two classes of eavesdroppers in this MUQKD
scheme. One is the vicious eavesdropper, Eve who does
not have the access to the particle A in each EPR pair.
The other is the server, Alice who provides the QIC for
the communication and keeps the particle A in the whole
process of the quantum communication. For the former,
the quantum communication between two parties in the
subsystem of this MUQKD scheme equals to Bennett-
Brassard-Mermin (BBM) QKD protocol [5] with or with-
out the help of the third parties, i.e., publishing his/her
unitary operations or results. For example, with the help
of Bob’s, Alice and Carol can complete the analysis of the
security of the quantum communication in the phase that
the QIC runs from Bob to Carol. The security is embod-
ied to the fact that the action of Eve’s will disturb the
quantum systems and will be detected by Alice and Carol
by analyzing the error rate of the results s
Cc0
obtained
by Carol with the control mode. From the view of eaves-
dropping check for Eve, this MUQKD scheme is equal to
the BBM QKD protocol [5], similar to that in the QSDC
protocol [28]. The BBM QKD protocol is proven uncon-
ditionally secure both in ideal condition [42] and in the
case with noise [43]. So this MUQKD scheme is secure
for Eve.
As Alice has the access to the particle A in each EPR
pair, she can obtain the unitary operations UB easily
and will not be detected if Bob only chooses the control
mode for eavesdropping check. That is, she performs
Bell state measurement on the EPR pair after the cod-
ing done by Bob and then gets the information without
leaving a trace. With the decoy technique, the story will
be changed. Alice will be found out if she monitors the
quantum channel between Bob and Carol as her actions
will introduce errors in the samples s
Cc1
. For s
Cc1
which
are obtained from the particles d, half of the results can
be used as the samples for eavesdropping check as the
4probability that Bob and Charlie choose the same MB
and then they can get the same results in principle is
50%. If there is an eavesdropper in the line, he/she will
introduce the errors in the results as he/she does not
know the MBs about the particles d and his/her action
will disturb the quantum systems, similar to that in BB84
QKD protocol [3, 27]. The error rate introduced by an
eavesdropper is 25% if he or she monitors all the quan-
tum signal. The probability for choosing the decoy mode
is similar to the case with the biased bases discussed in
Refs. [7, 21].
There are some common features between this
MUQKD scheme and that in Ref. [22]: (1) The QIC
is EPR pair and the four local unitary operations rep-
resent the different information encoded on the states;
(2) The efficiency for qubits ηq approaches 100% as al-
most all of the instance can be used as the useful qubits
and the total efficiency ηt is 50%; (3) Both of them have
high capacity; (4) The operations UC performed by the
receiver Carol are absolutely necessary for the QKD as
they make others know nothing about the operations UB
with the results of the combined operations published by
the server Alice UA = UB ⊗ UC and cannot obtain the
keys [22]; (5) The users need not prepare and measure
the EPR pairs, and the server provides the services; (6)
The users should have the ability for measuring a single
particle with two MBs.
Of course, there are some differences in these two
MUQKD schemes. Firstly, in this scheme there is only
one of the two particles in each EPR pair running through
the quantum channel, not both. Secondly, it is unneces-
sary for the users to store the QIC in this scheme, but
necessary in [22]. For preventing Alice from eavesdrop-
ping the keys, Bob should exploit the decoy mode with
a certain probability. As the decoy mode is only used for
eavesdropping, the particle d can be a faint laser pulse if
the QIC is photons in this scheme and any eavesdropping
will be detected [14]. In this way, there is not difficulty
for Bob to prepare the particle d, and this scheme is eas-
ier to be implemented than that in Ref. [22].
In summary, we have introduced a new multi-user
quantum key distribution scheme following the ideas in
quantum dense coding. This scheme is secure if the
sender of the information chooses the decoy mode with a
certain probability. It has high capacity and its efficiency
for qubit approaches 100% as almost all the EPR pairs
can used to transmit the information. There is only one
of the two particles in each EPR pair running through
the quantum channel, and then the loss of qubits is re-
duced when there is loss in the channel. Moreover, it does
not require the users on the network store the quantum
states and is more convenient for application than that
in [22].
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